Pp. 137-154 in Madeline A. Kalbach + Warren E. Kalbach (eds) 2000. Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada. Toronto: Harcourt Canada ISBN 0-7747-3658-5

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ETHNICITY AND IMMIGRANT OFFSPRING[1]

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INTRODUCTION

To date, few Canadian studies on immigrant offspring exist, despite the number of foreign-born and the substantial shifts in their ethnic origins during the past 50 years. What do we mean by the term "immigrant offspring," and why the neglect? Immigrant offspring usually are called either "the 1.5 generation" or "the second generation." Since foreign-born adults are considered to be the "first generation" to arrive in a new country, Canadian-born offspring of this "first" generation are called the "second" generation. Those foreign-born who immigrated as children, and who thus are neither the first nor the second generation, are "the 1.5 generation." Research has generally neglected the 1.5 and second generations because many censuses and surveys do not ask questions about the birthplace of parents or the age at immigration. For example, the 1971 census of population was the last to ask respondents about the birthplace of their parents. This question is necessary in order to distinguish between those Canadian-born who are offspring of foreign-born parents (the second generation) and those who are born to parents who are also Canadian-born (the third-plus generation). As a result, few studies of the 1.5 or the second generation exist in Canada (Boyd & Grieco, 1998).

Despite data gaps that dampened research on immigrant offspring, interest in the topic revived during the 1990s. This revival has three important characteristics. First, the earlier theory on the likely successes of these offspring has been revised. This revision explicitly acknowledges the roles played by ethnicity in shaping the variegated experiences of immigrant offspring. Second, the accompanying empirical studies redirect attention away from the experiences of adults to those youth who are still living with parents, particular those under age 18 or still in school. Third, scholars in the United States have dominated new approaches to theory and research on immigrant off-

spring. However, countries vary in their histories of race relations; in their approaches to multiculturalism; and in their policies and practices concerning immigration flows, labour markets, educational systems, and social welfare (see Reitz, 1998). Such differences generate two possibilities: (1) United States–based theoretical revisions may not fully apply to immigrant youth in Canada and in other countries; and (2) empirical conclusions on immigrant offspring in the United States may not be replicated elsewhere.

The objectives of this chapter derive from these three characteristics. First, we review the approaches to the study of North America's immigrant offspring, highlighting new developments that emphasize the roles played by ethnic identity and socio-economic resources. Second, we place these recent developments in the Canadian context. Data from the 1991 census show that the living situations of young immigrant offspring vary substantially according to their ethnic origins. The patterns of advantage and disadvantage caution us against constructing a homogeneous script about the experiences of immigrant offspring.

UNILATERAL SUCCESS OR SEGMENTED ASSIMILATION?

How has research related to immigrant offspring been conceptually recast in recent years? Prior to the 1990s, the orthodox approach stressed an optimistic scenario for immigrant offspring. According to the earlier linear (or "straight-line") theory, with increasing length of time spent by immigrants in the host society, or with each generation further removed from foreign-born predecessors, the socio-economic situations of "newcomer" groups would become similar to those of the North American–born (who were often of British ancestry). Such increasing similarities imply that any disadvantages faced by immigrants are overcome by subsequent generations.

The straight-line scenario is firmly embedded in the "classical" model of acculturation and assimilation, articulated first by writers in the Chicago School, headquartered at the University of Chicago during the early 1900s. This model was embellished by successive generations of U.S. scholars (for reviews, see Alba & Nee, 1997; Driedger, 1996: 23–37; Gans, 1992; Kallen, 1995: 162–187). Referring to newcomers' adoption of behaviours, rules, values, and norms of the host society, acculturation was almost always a faster process than assimilation, which includes the movement of groups out of the ethnic-based associations and other institutions into non-ethnic primary groups and institutions (Gans, 1997: 877). Yet both were seen as occurring in tandem, and as desired by social scientists and the public at large.

In recent years, this classical model has been extensively criticized, not only because of the normative element that views acculturation and assimilation as optimal and desirable, but also because of what it omits. At best a sociocultural theory (Gans, 1992), the straight-line, or linear, model pays little or no attention to influences coming from the following: shifts from an industrial to a service-based economy; economic booms and busts; changing residential patterns in the context of post–World War II metropolitan growth and suburbanization; the cessation of immigration flows between World Wars I and II that, in turn, alter the context within which integration occurs; and structural impediments arising from ethnic and racial discrimination (Alba & Nee, 1997; Gans, 1992; Massey, 1995; Zhou, 1997a, 1997b). Furthermore, it ignores dimensions of ethnicity that influence the experiences of the immigrant offspring, notably ethnic identity and ethnic-based communities.

Although it has many components and is expressed in many forms, ethnic identity generally describes the psychological and social attachments of individuals to groups on the basis of shared ancestry and/or social and cultural attributes (Driedger, 1996: Ch. 6; Isajiw, 1990). Ethnic identity can be modified over time, or maintained in two ways. The actions of other groups can create externally imposed boundaries on any given ethnic group. This typically occurs when the majority group discriminates against a particular group or defines it as racially distinct. Boundaries also can be created or enhanced by the existence of institutionally complete ethnic communities, often depicted by labels such as "Little Italy" or "Chinatown" (Breton, 1964). Constituted from social interaction based on common ties, ethnic communities often provide social and economic resources to members. In such communities, the monitoring actions of members can reinforce parental efforts at communicating values, norms, and expectations to young children (Zhou & Bankston, 1994, 1998). Although traditionally viewed as geographically delimited (e.g., Little Italy or Chinatown), ethnic communities need not be spatially grounded (Goldenberg & Haines, 1992). Non-local ties can reinforce ethnic identity by supplying needed resources (e.g., marriage partners, jobs, loans, financial backers).

Recent models modify the optimistic view of integration and acculturation implied by linear assimilation theory. Two U.S. sociologists (Portes, 1995; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997a, 1997b) have articulated three distinctive forms of integration for the 1.5 and second generations in the United States. The first assumes the orthodox success story. Over time, acculturation occurs alongside the integration of the (white) immigrant offspring into (white) mainstream economic and social life. However, this experience does not necessarily hold for all immigrant offspring. Rather, the pattern can be

one of segmented assimilation incorporating two additional scenarios. One depicts offspring rejection of parental values emphasizing education and hard work as mechanisms of mobility in the host society. Instead, immigrant offspring undergo acculturation and integration, and shift their identities into a primarily Black inner-city underclass, where outcomes are those of poverty and irregular employment. According to Portes and Zhou (1993), Caribbean youths are examples of this segmented, or truncated, assimilation. The other scenario emphasizes economic advancement, but with deliberate preservation of ethnic membership and values, and with continued economic attachment to ethnic communities. U.S. offspring most likely to display this pattern are members of immigrant groups that have well-developed ethnic-based economies such as the Chinese- or Cuban-origin groups (Portes, 1995; Portes & Zhou, 1993; see also Hirschman, 1994; Waters, 1994, 1997).

As developed most fully in the writings of Portes and Zhou, the new sociological perspectives of the 1990s offer conditional scripts. Which pathway is followed by an immigrant offspring group is heavily influenced by two sets of social relations: those that exist between parents and offspring, and convey norms, values, and expectations; and those that link parents and children to others. In the segmented-assimilation approach, ethnic-community ties and social networks are important mechanisms for accessing resources, particularly when parents lack the human capital (such as education, labour-market experience, or language skills) to sustain desired consumption patterns and to socialize offspring for life in the host society. In the absence of human capital, and in the face of racial barriers and inner-city residential nearness to the Black underclass, social capital is the key to thwarting the segmented-assimilation pattern of downward mobility into an underclass culture. Social capital is defined as the ability to command scarce resources by virtue of membership in networks, associations, or other social institutions. In an ethnic community, social capital allows parents to call on co-ethnics to reinforce normative expectations and to monitor the behaviours of offspring (see Zhou & Bankston, 1994, 1998). Resources outside the immediate family, such as educational loans or jobs for immigrant offspring, also may be obtained through networks (Portes, 1995; Portes & Zhou, 1993). In such circumstances, immigrant offspring are as likely as adults to assimilate into the larger society or to remain socially and economically active within an ethnic community.

Without social capital intimately associated with ethnic bonds, four other factors can determine the pathway of immigrant offspring. According to Portes and Zhou, in the absence of strong community ties, parental authority is most likely to be undermined under conditions of poverty and/or in settings where only one adult is present or when employment demands fre-

quently make both parents absent. The absence of a strong parental influence on normatively set goals is most likely to be converted into that of downward mobility and oppositional behaviours when three additional conditions hold: geographical residence in poor inner-city areas of the United States; historically rooted racial barriers that over time have created an underclass culture; and the existence of institutions such as schools that provide settings in which underclass norms and oppositional cultures are communicated. Depressed economic opportunities due either to economic restructuring or to pre-existing racial/ethnic barriers contribute further to the likelihood of assimilation into an underclass culture and to downward mobility, when the circumstances of immigrant offspring are compared with those of the parental generation or the mainstream groups.

In sum, scholars now outline three possible outcomes for immigrant children: (1) assimilation to the mainstream society, with economic success being a major indicator; (2) a continued emphasis on ethnic identity accompanied by integration into ethnic enclaves; and (3) the assumption of underclass identities along with marginal labour-market integration. Class and ethnicity influence the likelihood of each scenario. Groups that immigrate with high economic resources appear to be the most likely to follow the first pathway. Lower resources and strong ethnic fault lines increase the likelihood of the second or third pathway. Often such fault lines have originated historically through the actions of the majority against a particular group, resting on a "we–they" conceptualization. This process of racialization (Miles, 1989) is not solely based on colour, as shown by the nineteenth-century experiences of the Irish and Eastern European groups in the United States and in Canada. However, by themselves, low resources and ethnic boundaries do not elicit one outcome over another for immigrant offspring. Whether the second or third scenario holds is conditional on exposure to alternative ethnic identities, and on the presence or absence of ethnic communities with economic and social resources that can be accessed by parents and offspring.

These revisionist approaches to the fates of immigrant offspring largely rest on U.S. scholarship. It thus is appropriate to ask what the implications are for a Canadian audience. Two exist. First, the new theories provide new agendas for research on ethnic identity. Previous sociological studies in both Canada and the United States have emphasized ethnic-identity retention or loss between the first and second and third-plus generations (see Isajiw, 1990). Implicit in many of these studies is the assumption that loss of ethnic identity means the acquisition of an identity that represents either the dominant ethnic majority or a regional or national identity (Boyd, 1997; Kalin & Berry, 1995). However, the segmented-assimilation model describes an additional

outcome: acquiring a new ethnic identity that is accompanied by negative social and economic consequences. Whether or not, and under what conditions, persons acquire non-mainstream ethnic identities is a new question supplementing current Canadian research on retention and loss. Answering this question also is integral to the second issue arising from the U.S. discourse on immigrant offspring — notably, the need for an assessment of how well or how badly the new integration scenarios describe the situation in Canada. At the moment, there is no clear conclusion due to the lack of data on the 1.5 and second generations in Canada. However, as shown in the next section, both differences and similarities are likely to be observed in future studies.

THE CANADIAN CONTEXT

A central question arising from the new approaches to immigrant offspring is: which model holds for what ethnic/racial groups in Canada? Analysis of a 1994 survey on the educational and occupational achievements of second-generation adults supports the "straight line" upward-mobility scenario for a population whose parents are primarily born in the United States, the United Kingdom, or European countries (Boyd & Grieco, 1998). Earlier studies also find intergenerational mobility for immigrant offspring belonging to various ethnic-origin groups (see Isajiw, Sev'er, & Driedger, 1993; Kalbach et al., 1983; Richmond, 1986).

So far, little is known about the situation of immigrant offspring from areas such as Asia, South America and the Caribbean, and Africa. Immigrants from these areas began arriving in large numbers only after the removal of nationality as a criterion of admissibility in 1962 and 1967, and most second-generation adults are still young, having been born in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, second-generation adults from non-European ethnic origins are not found in surveys in numbers sufficient for analysis. At the moment, one can only speculate about possible outcomes. Many of the non-European ethnic-origin groups in Canada appear to have well-developed ethnic economies, where members are self-employed, and/or own businesses that both service and employ co-ethnics. For the largest of these groups, the Chinese, the model of ethnic-enclave assimilation may characterize immigrant offspring. However, the extent to which this route is followed, and by what ethnic groups, remains to be explored. In their critique of the ethnic-enclave concept, Alba and Nee (1997) suggest that ethnic economies have not been large enough to offer much employment for subsequent generations. They note that most immigrants and their offspring work in the "open" or non-ethnic economy.

In the Canadian context, the scenario that emphasizes the absorption of (Black) immigrant offspring into the inner-city underclass remains the scenario least likely to be successfully transposed from U.S. research. This motif emphasizes not merely the movement of youth into a world of poverty, marginal employment, and crime, but its subsequent persistence for later generations. Two factors make this "underclass" scenario less of a possibility for immigrant offspring in Canada. First and foremost, Canada never developed the pervasive and pernicious Black/white fault line of race relations and stratification that has so powerfully shaped U.S. history, politics, and policy. Although discrimination along colour lines existed and continues into the present day (Henry et al., 1995), slavery was outlawed in Britain and in the dominions in the 1830s. Canada did not experience a war of secession over slavery or the Jim Crow practices that effectively disenfranchised a Black population. As well, historically, Canada's Black population was small in contrast to a larger U.S. Black population heavily concentrated in the South. The particular configuration of forces shaping race relations in the United States — the institution of slavery; large numbers of Blacks; high regional concentration but over a large geographical area, primarily in the South; a civil war; and subsequent actions by the white majority to maintain power over Blacks in the South — were not replicated in Canada.

Second, in Canada, the 1759 British victory over the French on the Plains of Abraham in Quebec City left a legacy that emphasized language and culture rather than race. Unlike the United States, Canada has an explicit multiculturalism policy, first adopted in 1971, and reaffirmed with the 1988 passage of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. The minimal impact of such policy is twofold: (1) it emphasizes the symbolic importance of diversity in Canadian society; and (2) it contributes to the emergence of specific ethnic associations and to the existence of umbrella ethnocultural organizations that lobby and interact with municipal, provincial, and federal government departments. By shaping the context in which race and ethnicity are viewed, and the discourse where ethnic and race relations are discussed, multiculturalism policy has the potential to influence indirectly the experiences of immigrant offspring.

These factors suggest that segmented assimilation into the underclass may be less likely in Canada. Whether the underclass scenario is less viable in Canada, however, awaits future research on groups of immigrant offspring that are most vulnerable. This includes those who are members of visible minorities, where parental resources are low and where ethnic-based communities are non-existent or lacking in resources. As well, the underclass model assumes that such immigrant offspring live near and attend school with

members of indigenous groups that have developed cultures and economic strategies to deal with decades and centuries of deprivation and discrimination. In the United States, the inner-city impoverished Black population is considered to be such an indigenous group. It is not clear that Canada has a comparable underclass residing in its large cities. The Black population in Canada is diverse in history, in origins, and in socio-economic circumstances. Some arrived in Canada in the 1800s, via the United States, while others are relative newcomers, having immigrated since the 1960s from Caribbean, Latin American, and African countries. Aboriginal youth also appear to have a low potential for influencing immigrant youth. Although the Aboriginal population does concentrate in areas of Canada's cities characterized by high poverty (Balakrishnan & Hou, 1999; Kazemipur & Halli, 1997), other conditions mitigate their selection as a reference population: numbers are relatively small; many migrate from reserves to cities as older adolescents or as adults; they thus are not attending elementary or secondary schools; and the geographical space occupied is not as extensive as found in many inner-city ghettos in the United States. Overall, one task in any future Canadian depictions of underclass assimilation will be to identify the underclass reference-group population(s) for immigrant youth.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF IMMIGRANT OFFSPRING IN CANADA

Although the "jury is still out" on the fate of immigrant offspring of non-European ethnic origin, the experiences of growing up in Canada and earning a living in adulthood without a doubt will vary by ethnic origins. This assertion rests on the fact that countries vary internationally in their educational systems, in economic structures, in family structures and living arrangements, and in norms and practices concerning social and economic exchanges. Immigrants bring with them the imprint of their societies, and in doing so vary in the resources they can individually and collectively offer their children. Hints of this likely variability are evident from 1991 census data for youth under the age of 15, living in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. These cities were chosen because they attract most of the post-1960s immigrants, and it is here that 61 percent of the 1.5 generation (i.e., foreign-born children) resided in 1991 (compared with 27 percent of Canadian-born children).

Census data from the Public Use Microdata Files are not perfect for this task of examining the current situation of immigrant offspring. The absence

of a census question on birthplace of parents means that the second generation cannot be separated from the third-plus generation. (For many recently arrived ethnic groups, the former probably predominates in the Canadian-born category.) Because records on parents and children cannot be linked in the Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) of individuals, the human capital and resources of parents cannot be determined.[2] However, indirect information can be obtained by examining the household and housing situation, the living arrangements, and the economic characteristics of the units in which children reside. This is done for those ethnic-origin groups[3] that had at least 100 foreign-born respondents in the PUMF of individuals who were less than 15 years old and who were living in Montreal, Toronto, or Vancouver. Because the microdata file of individuals is a 3 percent sample of the Canadian population, 100 children represent approximately 3333 persons.

Reflecting the legacy of over 300 years of immigration, most children under age 15 in Canada are Canadian-born, and the British (English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh) and French ethnic-origin groups are the largest. Not surprisingly, fewer than 10 percent of children living in Canada's three largest cities are foreign-born, with 2 percent and 1 percent, respectively, for British and French ethnic-origin groups (see Table 10.1). However, the 1.5 generation occupies a larger share of the under-15 youth for other ethnic-origin groups, ranging from 10 percent for those of Jewish ethnic origin to over 40 percent for West Asian youth. With the exception of the Vietnamese, over half of these children were age 5 or older when they arrived, implying that in many instances new languages must be acquired simultaneously with insertion into provincial educational systems. Many also are recent arrivals, possibly still grappling with Canadian customs and institutions, and mass culture.

The new models of assimilation emphasize the importance of resources in shaping the experiences of immigrant offspring. U.S. studies show that some Hispanic, Asian, and Caribbean immigrant youth live in crowded conditions, in lone-parent families and in households with low incomes, implying that these groups with low resources may be at risk for segmented assimilation paths (Jensen & Chitose, 1994; Landale & Oropesa, 1995; Oropesa & Landale, 1997). In Canada, substantial ethnic variation exists in such indicators (see Table 10.2), and at least two patterns are discernible for Canadian-born and foreign-born youth under age 15. First, when the fourteen ethnic-origin groups are arranged in order for foreign-born offspring (see Table 10.2), a pattern is evident in which the more disadvantaged are usually immigrant offspring whose ethnic origins are non-European. This pattern describes foreign-born offspring living in households where: (a) density is one person or more per room; and (b) economic indicators show low levels of economic re-

TABLE 10.1

SAMPLE NUMBERS, PERCENT CANADIAN- AND FOREIGN-BORN, AND AGE AT IMMIGRATION AND AVERAGE YEARS IN CANADA FOR THE FOREIGN-BORN, CHILDREN, AGE 14 AND LESS, FOR SELECT ETHNIC-ORIGIN GROUPS, LIVING IN MONTREAL, TORONTO, AND VANCOUVER, 1991

	Sample Numbers		Percent of Ethnic Groups that are		Foreign-Born Only	
	Canadian-Born	Foreign-Born	Canadian-Born	Foreign-Born	Percent Immigrating at Age 5+	Average Years in Canada
Total, Select Groups[a]	37 232	3 757	91	9	54	3.8
British	16 097	327	98	2	40	5.2
French	14 483	112	99	1	43	4.9
Polish	1 256	234	84	16	58	4.1
Portuguese	1 198	180	87	13	56	3.9
Spanish	516	173	75	25	64	3.7
Jewish	1 572	175	90	10	49	3.9
Chinese	2 032	887	70	30	59	3.5
Filipino	542	166	77	23	52	3.5
Vietnamese	245	148	62	38	35	5.8
Black/Caribbean	2 399	396	86	14	54	4.2
Arab	567	314	64	36	54	2.4
West Asian	268	190	59	42	60	3.3
South Asian	2 100	470	82	18	53	3.6
Latin/Central/South American	363	244	60	40	55	3.5

[a] Refers only to those ethnic-origin groups listed in the table. Multiple ethnic-origin responses exist, and an individual may be in one or more of the listed ethnic groups.

Source: Produced by the author from records on individual respondents, Statistics Canada, *1991 Census of Population,* Public Use Microdata File, Individuals.

TABLE 10.2

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILDREN, AGE 14 AND LESS, FOR SELECT ETHNIC-ORIGIN GROUPS, CANADIAN- AND FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, LIVING IN MONTREAL, TORONTO, AND VANCOUVER, 1991

	Percentages		Rank Order		Ratio (1)/(2)
	Foreign-Born (1)	Canadian-Born (2)	Foreign-Born (3)	Canadian-Born (4)	Foreign- to Canadian-Born (5)
PERCENT WITH 1+ PERSON PER ROOM					
Total, Select Group[a]	40.6	13.7	–	–	2.97
British	15.0	7.8	1	1	1.93
French	15.2	10.9	2	4	1.39
Jewish	25.1	8.0	3	2	3.14
Chinese	27.8	21.3	4	6	1.31
Portuguese	40.6	18.6	5	5	2.18
Polish	41.5	9.3	6	3	4.45
South Asian	43.4	25.1	7	7	1.73
Black/Caribbean	44.2	27.7	8	9	1.60
Latin/Central/ South American	53.3	31.4	9	13	1.70
Vietnamese	55.4	46.1	10	14	1.20
Filipino	56.0	29.7	11	12	1.89
West Asian	56.3	27.2	12	8	2.07
Spanish	57.8	29.3	13	11	1.98
Arab	59.2	27.9	14	10	2.13
PERCENT IN LONE-PARENT FAMILIES					
Total, Select Group[a]	11.7	14.6	–	–	0.80
Portuguese	4.4	8.4	1	4	0.53
Chinese	4.8	6.0	2	2	0.81
Jewish	5.7	9.4	3	6	0.61
Arab	5.7	8.1	4	3	0.71
South Asian	6.4	4.7	5	1	1.37
Filipino	8.4	9.4	6	7	0.90
Polish	8.5	11.1	7	8	0.77
West Asian	11.6	9.0	8	5	1.29
French	15.2	15.6	9	10	0.98
British	16.8	14.0	10	9	1.20
Latin/Central/ South American	18.0	18.7	11	13	0.96
Vietnamese	20.9	18.0	12	12	1.17
Spanish	22.5	17.2	13	11	1.31
Black/Caribbean	34.1	36.0	14	14	0.95

(continued)

(Table 10.2 continued)

	Percentages		Rank Order		Ratio (1)/(2)
	Foreign-Born (1)	Canadian-Born (2)	Foreign-Born (3)	Canadian-Born (4)	Foreign- to Canadian-Born (5)
PERCENT LIVING IN FAMILIES BELOW LOW-INCOME CUTOFFS[b]					
Total, Select Group[a]	17.8	28.7	–	–	0.62
Filipino	7.8	13.7	1	3	0.57
Portuguese	12.1	16.1	2	7	0.75
Jewish	13.1	11.9	3	1	1.10
British	13.7	13.9	4	4	0.99
Polish	16.7	12.9	5	2	1.29
French	23.0	17.5	6	8	1.31
Chinese	26.7	14.6	7	5	1.83
South Asian	28.1	15.5	8	6	1.81
Black/Caribbean	36.6	37.5	9	12	0.98
West Asian	39.4	26.1	10	9	1.51
Spanish	40.0	30.7	11	11	1.30
Latin/Central/ South American	47.7	38.1	12	13	1.25
Vietnamese	49.1	40.2	13	14	1.22
Arab	50.5	26.3	14	10	1.92
PERCENT LIVING IN FAMILIES WHERE GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PAYMENTS ARE THE MAIN SOURCE OF 1990 INCOME[b]					
Total, Select Group[a]	9.5	12.5	–	–	0.76
Filipino	1.1	6.7	1	5	0.17
Portuguese	3.0	7.1	2	6	0.43
British	6.9	7.7	3	7	0.90
Chinese	7.0	5.4	4	2	1.30
South Asian	7.1	6.4	5	4	1.11
Polish	9.2	5.5	6	3	1.65
Jewish	12.1	4.6	7	1	2.62
French	12.3	10.1	8	9	1.22
Spanish	18.8	15.5	9	11	1.21
Arab	19.2	9.5	10	8	2.02
Black/Caribbean	19.3	21.5	11	13	0.90
Latin/Central/ South American	21.5	16.7	12	12	1.29
West Asian	25.0	10.2	13	10	2.44
Vietnamese	37.5	28.1	14	14	1.33

(continued)

(Table 10.2 continued)

	Income		Rank Order		Ratio (1)/(2)
	Foreign-Born (1)	Canadian-Born (2)	Foreign-Born (3)	Canadian-Born (4)	Foreign- to Canadian-Born (5)
PER CAPITA 1990 HOUSEHOLD INCOME[b]					
Total, Select Group[a]	10 742	13 645	–	–	0.79
British	14 346	14 982	1	3	0.96
French	13 329	13 495	2	5	0.99
Jewish	13 288	16 841	3	1	0.79
Polish	12 749	15 150	4	2	0.84
Filipino	12 712	13 111	5	6	0.97
Portuguese	11 942	11 849	6	10	1.01
South Asian	10 763	11 995	7	8	0.90
Chinese	10 574	13 553	8	4	0.78
West Asian	10 512	11 989	9	9	0.88
Black/Caribbean	8 926	9 965	10	12	0.90
Latin/Central/ South American	8 782	9 584	11	14	0.92
Spanish	8 169	10 913	12	11	0.75
Arab	7 519	12 036	13	7	0.62
Vietnamese	7 006	9 670	14	13	0.72

[a] Refers only to those ethnic-origin groups listed in the table. Multiple-ethnic-origin responses exist, and an individual may be in one or more of the listed ethnic groups.
[b] Calculated only for children arriving before 1990. Income data are assigned a value of zero for immigrants arriving in 1991. For immigrants arriving in 1990, most income data refer to Canadian income, and the magnitude of total income thus is sensitive to when in 1990 individuals, families, or households arrived.

Source: Produced by the author from records on individual respondents, Statistics Canada, *1991 Census of Population*, Public Use Microdata File, Individuals.

sources. These indicators are low per-capita household incomes, higher percentages with family income below the Statistics Canada measure of low-income cutoffs, and where government transfer payments are the major source of 1990 income. Living in households or families with poor economic resources is particularly likely for immigrant offspring whose ethnic origins are Arab, Black/Caribbean, Latin/Central/South American, Spanish (which, among the foreign-born, includes primarily persons born in the Americas, including the United States), Vietnamese, and West Asian. The pattern for immigrant offspring in lone-parent families does not completely fit the more general findings for density and economic indicators, in part because relative-

ly high percentages of immigrant children of British or French origins are likely to be in lone-parent families. Offspring of other non-European ethnic-origin groups are less likely to be in lone-parent families, perhaps because of the emphasis on familism in these groups (Boyd, 1998) and strong sanctions again divorce.

A second pattern is the similar rankings of indicators for both foreign-born and Canadian-born children of the same ethnic-origin groups.[4] This second pattern indicates that ethnic stratification exists. Regardless of birthplace, children in some groups are more likely than those in other groups to be in households characterized by higher density, to be in lone-parent families, and to experience low economic status. However, as indicated by ratios calculated by dividing percentages for the foreign-born by those for Canadian-born youth (see Table 10.2, column 5), foreign-born offspring usually are more likely than Canadian-born offspring to live in such circumstances. Again, the one exception to this is the indicator of living in lone-parent families. Other than those of British, Latin American, Spanish, South Asian, Vietnamese, and West Asian ethnic origins, immigrant children have lower percentages living in lone-parent families than do corresponding Canadian-born children. Why this is so cannot be determined from available census data.

CONCLUSION

The model of linear, or straight-line, assimilation depicts a scenario in which later generations of offspring will steadily move up socially and economically. In the process, these offspring will surpass the achievements of the foreign-born generation and achieve — or exceed — the standing of the majority population. This script has been rewritten in the past ten years by scholars in the United States, who argue that pathways to assimilation also can include assimilation into the ethnic enclave or absorption into the underclass. Ethnic identities and social capital found in ethnic communities are key determinants of which groups will follow which path.

Left uncharted are the trails to be travelled by the offspring of the post-1960s immigrant groups in Canada. The ambiguity is caused partly by the fact that many of these offspring are still young and, at best, in early adulthood. Data gaps also exist, with no census and few surveys asking respondents where their parents were born. Part of the ambiguity arises as well from the differences that exist between Canada and the United States in their histories and in their emphases on multiculturalism, suggesting that what is observed in the United States may not occur in Canada. A final uncertainty comes from

the fact that situations do change over time, and the circumstances today for young immigrant offspring may not describe their experiences in adulthood (Alba & Nee, 1997).

It is true that immigrant youth whose ethnic origins are Arab, Black/Caribbean, Latin/Central/South American, Spanish, Vietnamese, or West Asian are, in varying degrees, growing up in settings of high density, with a single parent, and in reduced economic circumstances. Sociologists have documented that, in general, children growing up in single-parent families and/or in impoverished circumstances are themselves likely to leave home and school early, and to thus be at a disadvantage in the labour market. Such conditions also can be precursors of segmented, rather than linear, assimilation of immigrant offspring. However, low resources indicate a potential for, rather than a prediction of, segmented assimilation either into an ethnic enclave or accompanied by downward mobility. For some offspring, low resources in childhood — although real — may be temporary to the extent that they reflect how recently immigration was (see Table 10.1). Ties and social networks within a larger ethnic community also may provide access to needed resources, thus offsetting low levels existing within the immediate family. In short, the revisionist scripts that carry us into the twenty-first century caution us against anticipating a homogeneous outcome, pointing instead to the importance of ethnic identity, resources, and ethnic communities in shaping the futures of Canada's immigrant offspring.

NOTES

1. The author thanks Elizabeth Grieco for editorial suggestions on an earlier draft.
2. Statistics Canada also produces family and household public-use files. However, birthplace and ethnic origins categories are very collapsed on these files, thereby preventing a meaningful analysis of the socio-economic circumstances of immigrant offspring by ethnic origins.
3. Ethnic-origin groups are constructed by Statistics Canada from answers obtained from the following quesion on the 1991 census questionnaire: "To which ethnic or cultural group(s) did this person's ancestors belong?"
4. Foreign- and Canadian-born similarities in rankings also are evident from high and positive Spearman rank-order correlations of .807 for one or more persons per room, .877 for lone-parent families, .798 for 1990 per-capita household income; .767 for families below low-income cutoffs, and .820 for families where government transfer payments are the main income source. The Spearman rank-order correlation has a value of 0 where no association between rankings exists, a value of –1 when two rankings are completely opposite, and a value of +1 when two rankings are identical.

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

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